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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to determine which motives play a 
significant role in determining the extent of a firm’s repurchasing activity. For 
firms repurchasing through the open market, the motives include taking 
advantage of perceived undervaluation, increasing financial leverage, 
distributing cash to shareholders, and reducing agency costs. For firms using 
a tender offer, the motives include taking advantage of perceived 
undervaluation and having the ability to significantly increase financial 
leverage. Also, the hypothesis that the perceived undervaluation motive is 
stronger for smaller firms is tested. Three censored regression models are 
employed, and each model’s explanatory variables represent commonly cited 
motives for repurchasing stock.
Repurchasing activity is measured by the amount of cash distributed to 
shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the 
firm’s average market capitalization. The final sample includes 596 open 
market repurchasing firms, 11 tender offer repurchasing firms, and 991 non- 
repurchasing firms. The cross-sectional analysis covers the firm’s fiscal year 
ending between March 31,1996 and April 1,1997.
There are three primary conclusions of this study. First, perceived 
undervaluation, financial leverage, excess cash, and agency costs all play
iii
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important roles in determining the percentage of market capitalization a firm 
repurchases in the open market. Second, no evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that perceived undervaluation and financial leverage impact the 
percentage of market capitalization a firm repurchases through a tender offer. 
This is possibly due to the fact that only 11 tender offers were observed during 
the period studied. The third conclusion is that small firms are more likely to 
repurchase stock in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
iv
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this dissertation to many wonderful people god 
has placed in my life. To my lovely wife, whose love and support kept me 
going throughout this difficult process. To my adorable daughter, whose smiles 
and laughter put everything in perspective. To my parents and step parents, 
you instilled in me the determination that made this accomplishment possible. 
To the greatest grandparents and step grandparents, your influence in my life 
is immeasurable. To my brother and sisters, carefully set your goals and then 
let nothing stand in your way. To my many aunts and uncles, you have all 
been excellent role models for me. And finally, to my dissertation committee, 
you have each impacted my life in a special way. I will forever be indebted to 
these people.
v




LIST OF TA B LES......................................................................................................... viii
INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
Statement of Pro blem ............................................................................................. 7
Purpose o f  the St u d y ...............................................................................................8
Propo sitio ns ................................................................................................................9
Proposition 1 :........................................................................................................... 9
Proposition 2 : ........................................................................................................... 9
Proposition 3 : ........................................................................................................... 9
Proposition 4 : ........................................................................................................... 9
Proposition 5 : ......................................................................................................... 10
Proposition 6 : ......................................................................................................... 10
Proposition 7 : ......................................................................................................... 10
Proposition 8 : .........................................................................................................10
Lim itations of the Stu d y ......................................................................................... 11
Plan of St u d y ........................................................................................................... 11
LITERATURE R EVIEW ................................................................................................13
Section 1: T heoretical Justification for Share Repu r c h a ses .................. 13
Section 2: Repurchase Announcement Effects on Share Pr ic es ..............18
Subsection 2.1: Tender Offer and Open Market Repurchases....................18
Subsection 2.2: Targeted Share Repurchases (TSR s)................................. 27
Section 3: Operating and Financial Characteristics of Share
Repurchasing  Firm s .................................................................................... 30
Section 4: Other Resea r c h ..................................................................................33
Section 5: Conclusions.......................................................................................... 36
METHODOLOGY OF PROPOSITIONS’ VALIDATION......................................... 38
Section 1: Propositions Related to  Open Market Repurchases ...............39
Proposition 1 :.........................................................................................................39
Proposition 2 : .........................................................................................................40
Proposition 3 : .........................................................................................................42
Proposition 4 : .........................................................................................................43
vi
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Proposition 5 : ..................................................................................................... 44
Section  2: Propositions Related to T ender Offer  Repurchases...........45
Proposition 6 : ....................................................................................................... 45
Proposition 7 : ....................................................................................................... 46
Section 3: Small Firms and the Undervaluation Mo tiv e ............................ 47
Proposition 8 : ....................................................................................................... 47
Section 4: The Repurchase Mo dels...................................................................49
Open Market Repurchase Model....................................................................... 50
Tender Offer Repurchase Model....................................................................... 50
Small Firm Undervaluation Model...................................................................50
DATA AND EMIPIRCAL FINDINGS....................................................................... 54
Section 1: Da ta ..................................................................................................... 54
Section  2: Descriptive Statistics..................................................................... 59
Section 3: Estimation of the Regression Equations................................... 63
CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 69
Section 1: Propositions and Empirical Evidence .......................................... 70
Proposition 1 :........................................................................................................70
Proposition 2 : ........................................................................................................70
Proposition 3 : ........................................................................................................ 71
Proposition 4 : ........................................................................................................ 71
Proposition 5 : ........................................................................................................72
Proposition 6 : ........................................................................................................72
Proposition 7 : ........................................................................................................73
Proposition 8 : ........................................................................................................73
Section 2: Literary Contributions................................................................... 74
Section 3: Limitations and Directions for Future Re s e a r c h ................... 75
APPENDIX....................................................................................................................77
Exhibit 2-1: Theoretical Justification for Share Repurchases...............78
Exhibit 2-2.1: Repurchase Announcement Effects on  Share Prices:
T ender  Offers and Open Market Repur c h a ses ...............................80
Exhibit 2-2.2: Repurchase Announcement Effects on Share Prices:
Targeted Share Repurchases............................................................... 84
Exhibit 2-3: Operating and Financial Characteristics of Firms that
Repurchase Shares..................................................................................85
Exhibit 2-4: Other Research...............................................................................86
REFERENCES............................................................................................................88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4-1: Industries Represented in the Sample..............................................55
Table 4-2: Value Line Filter................................................................................. 58
Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix.................................... 60
Table 4-4: Regression Results from the Open Market Repurchase Model......66
Table 4-5: Regression Results from the Tender Offer Repurchase Model......67
Table 4-6: Regression Results from the Small Firm Undervaluation Model.....68
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Corporations primarily distribute cash to common shareholders through 
dividends and share repurchases. Dividends have historically been the 
preferred method, but share repurchases are growing in popularity. 
Announced dollar repurchases grew at an annual compound rate of 18.4% 
from 1983 to 1996.1 Also, in 1995 the dollars distributed through repurchases 
roughly equaled the dollars paid in dividends.2 Some firms, like Microsoft, only 
repurchase stock, while others, like Wal-Mart, pay dividends and buy back 
stock. According to Securities Data Corporation, there were over 6,250 
repurchase announcements from 1990 to 1996.
The primary methods used for repurchasing stock are tender offers and 
open market repurchases. A company using a tender offer typically agrees to 
buy a certain percentage of its outstanding shares at a stated price on a 
specified date from those shareholders that indicate a willingness to sell. Firms 
generally repurchase about 15% of their equity in a tender offer, and the
1 Source: Securities Data Corporation.
2 Brigham and Gapenski, page 691.
1
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average premium offered is 22% above the market price prior to the 
repurchase announcement.3
Many motivations for tender offers have been suggested, but the 
consensus view is that tender offers are typically used by companies to take 
advantage of perceived undervaluation.4 For example, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1990) find that firms announcing a tender offer generally earn 
positive risk-adjusted returns during the two-year period following the 
repurchase announcement. They conclude that the market generally 
underestimated the information value of a tender offer announcement during 
the 1980 to 1990 period. Their findings support the perceived undervaluation 
(information signaling) motive.
An open market repurchase is more flexible than a tender offer and often 
takes place over several years. Open market repurchase plans are generally 
announced, and the announcement usually states the amount and duration of 
the planned repurchases. For example, General Motors announced in early 
1998 that it will buy an additional $4 billion of its stock over the subsequent 
twelve months in order to return capital to its shareholders.5 An open market 
repurchasing company buys its shares through one broker, and sellers are
3 See Oann (1981); Vermaelen (1981); and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990).
4 See Vermaelen (1981); Dann (1981); Asquith and Mullins (1986); Ofer and Thakor (1987); 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989); and Hausch and Seward (1993).
5 Wall Street Journal. February 10,1998.
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unaware they are selling to the company * The average announcement period 
abnormal return is 3.5% / According to Securities Data Corporation, about 
90% of all announced repurchases in the 1986 to 1995 period were to be 
carried out through the open market.
Unlike tender offers, there is a lack of consensus as to the general 
motivation(s) for open market repurchases. Some researchers suggest that 
companies repurchase stock in the open market in order to take advantage of 
perceived undervaluation. However, as Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) point 
out, it is doubtful that perceived undervaluation is the only motivation for an 
open market repurchase because of the fact that 25% of S&P 500 firms 
announced a repurchase program in 1994. It is unlikely that so many of the 
most scrutinized firms believed their stock was undervalued at the same time.
Another motivation that has been offered is that firms use open market 
repurchases to optimally adjust their capital structure. Repurchasing stock 
increases financial leverage, holding other factors constant. Masulis (1980) 
analyzes 199 firms that used a tender offer and finds some support for the 
financial leverage motive.
Rule 10B-18 under the Securities Exchange Act places four restrictions on a company 
repurchasing shares in the open market. First, the company can only operate through one 
broker. Second, the company cannot lead the market. Third, the company cannot buy at the 
opening price or buy in the last half-hour of trading. Fourth, the company's daily repurchase 
limit is equal to 25% of the previous four-week daily volume average.
See Vermaelen (1981) and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996).
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Others suggest that companies employ open market repurchases in 
order to distribute excess cash to shareholders. In fact, Bierman and West 
(1966) argue that the sole benefit of a repurchase program stems from tax 
advantages over dividends. Investors are believed to prefer repurchases to 
dividends because repurchases are taxed at potentially lower capital gains 
rates.*
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market repurchase 
plans are initiated by companies in order to create a repurchase option. This 
option allows management to repurchase stock whenever they believe it is 
undervalued, thus benefiting long-term shareholders. Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen find that much of the variability in the announcement period return 
is explained by three determinants of option value.
Repurchase motives cited less frequently include the reissue motive and 
the management entrenchment motive. The reissue motive hypothesizes that a 
firm repurchases stock simply to diminish the dilution of earnings per share 
caused by conversions, mergers, and/or exercised options. The management 
entrenchment motive hypothesizes that management initiates a share 
repurchase program in order to reduce or eliminate the probability of a 
takeover.
8 Under the U.S. tax code, repurchases only receive capital gains treatment if the distribution is 
not in essence replacing a dividend. Also, during the period studied here, the highest marginal 
tax rate for dividends (ordinary income) was 39.6% and for capital gains was 28%.
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The literature generally contains three types of empirical studies that 
relate to repurchases. The first type examines the announcement period 
returns for firms initiating a repurchase program.8 For example, Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996) first calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 892 
firms announcing an open market repurchase plan. Next, they regress CAR on 
the fraction of shares authorized for repurchase, the standard deviation of the 
firm's total returns, and the firm’s R-squared from the market model. They find 
that these three variables explain much of the variability in the announcement 
period return among firms, and they conclude that creating a repurchase option 
is an important motivation for open market repurchase plans.
The second type of empirical study analyzes the subsequent 
performance of firms announcing repurchase programs.10 For example, 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that firms announcing an 
open market repurchase plan that had high book-to-market value ratios had a 
four year buy-and-hold abnormal return of about 45%. They conclude that the 
market inefficiently processed information related to open market repurchase 
announcements during the 1980 to 1990 period. Their research suggests that, 
at least for small firms, an important motivation for announcing an open market 
repurchase plan is undervaluation.
9 See Masulis (1080); Vermaelen (1081); Dann (1081); Netter and Mitchell (1080); Comment 
and Jarrell (1001); Howe, He, and Kao (1002); and Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1006).
10 See Vermaelen (1081); Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1000); Dann, Masulis, and Mayers 
(1001); Bartov (1001); and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1005).
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The third type of empirical study compares repurchasing firms to non­
repurchasing firms.11 For example, Finnerty (1974) compares firms whose 
number of shares decreased during the year (repurchasing firms) to firms 
whose number of shares increased during the year (issuing firms). He finds 
that prior to repurchase, repurchasing firms use less financial leverage and 
have higher dividend yields than issuing firms.
The present study fits into the third type of empirical work dealing with 
share repurchases. The objective is to determine the motivating factors that 
influence some firms to repurchase large amounts of stock in the open market 
or through a tender offer and other firms to repurchase little or no stock. Three 
censored regression models are employed, and each model’s explanatory 
variables represent commonly cited motives for repurchasing stock. For firms 
repurchasing through the open market, the motives include taking advantage of 
management perceived undervaluation, increasing financial leverage, 
distributing cash to shareholders, and reducing agency costs.12 For firms using 
a tender offer, the motives include taking advantage of perceived 
undervaluation and having the capacity to significantly increase financial
11 See Young (1969); Norgaard and Noigaanl ( i974); and Finnerty (1975).
12 The tax savings motive, reissue motive, and management entrenchment motive are not 
included in the models for various reasons. The logical approach for testing the tax savings 
motive is a time series study. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) take this approach and find that 
buyback activity fails to decrease following the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It is very unlikely that 
the reissue motive and the management entrenchment motive explain the rapid growth rate of 
repurchasing activity in the 1980s and 1990s. There is no doubt that these motives play 
significant roles in some repurchasing programs, but in general they are not believed to 
significantly affect repurchasing behavior.
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leverage. Also, the hypothesis that the perceived undervaluation motive is 
stronger for smaller firms is tested. The goal of this study is to determine which 
motive(s) play a significant role in determining the magnitude of a firm’s 
repurchasing activity.13
This study differs from previous studies in several ways. First, this study 
employs three censored regression models. No other study dealing with 
repurchases uses a censored regression model. Second, the time frame used 
for the cross-sectional analysis is a firm’s fiscal year ending between March 31, 
1996 and April 1, 1997. Repurchasing activity has increased significantly 
throughout the 1990s, and this increase may be due to changing motivations 
that are not captured in earlier studies. Third, no other study considers the 
impact agency costs have on share repurchases.
Statement of Problem 
Why do firms repurchase stock? The most general answer, and the one 
that shareholders hope to be true, is that firms repurchase stock in order to 
increase shareholder wealth. Several approaches have been taken to 
determine the specific motivations for repurchasing stock. One approach is to 
simply survey managers concerning their motivation(s) for a repurchase 
program. A problem with this approach is that managers may not give truthful
13 Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) state that "repurchase programs mil be appealing to firms 
with excess debt capacity, excess cash, few growth opportunities, and as the exchange model 
suggests, the potential for mispricing.” In essence, this research tests their statement.
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answers. A second approach is to infer motivations by studying firms that 
announce repurchase programs. A limitation of this approach is that many 
firms fail to repurchase as many shares as they announce. A third approach, 
and one that has been used infrequently, is to analyze firms that actually 
repurchase stock in order to deduce repurchase motivations. This study 
focuses on the amount of cash that firms distribute to shareholders through 
share repurchases and the factors that explain the variability of this cash 
distribution among firms.
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine the motivating factors that 
influence some firms to repurchase large amounts of stock and other firms to 
repurchase little or no stock. It is believed that the motivations for 
repurchasing stock differ based on whether a firm uses a tender offer or the 
open market. Three censored regression models are employed and the 
explanatory variables in each model represent commonly cited motives for 
repurchasing stock. The determinants of open market repurchasing activity to 
be developed and tested are perceived undervaluation, financial leverage, 
excess cash, and agency costs. The determinants of tender offer repurchasing 
activity to be developed and tested are perceived undervaluation and financial 
leverage. This study also tests whether or not the perceived undervaluation 
motive is stronger for smaller firms.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Propositions 
This study tests the following eight propositions.
9
Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.
Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are 
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in 
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.
Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market. The larger a firm’s cash inflows, the greater the need to distribute cash 
to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
Proposition 4:
Firms that have lower investment cash outflows are motivated to 
repurchase a larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market. The smaller the firm's investment cash outflows, the greater the need 
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
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Proposition 5:
Firms that have more diverse ownership structures will repurchase a 
larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open market in order to 
reduce agency costs. Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency 
costs by forcing the company to rely more heavily on external funds.
Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender 
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of 
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.
Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a 
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
Proposition 8:
The perceived undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for 
smaller firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts, and 
management is therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
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Limitations of the Study
This study excludes:
1. Foreign firms.
2. Firms in industries subject to significant regulation such as banking, 
thrift, insurance, other financial services, and utilities.
3. Firms in industries that have fewer than five observations.
4. Firms that are not included on Value Line Investment Surveys 
September 1997, compact disc or that have important missing 
information.
5. Firms that are not included on Global Researcher's November 1997, 
compact disc or that have important missing information.
6. Firms that are not on the Edgar website14 or that have important 
missing information.
Plan of Study
Chapter 2 reviews the important historical research related to share 
repurchases and is divided into five sections. Section 1 reviews theories 
justifying share repurchases. Section 2 discusses the work related to share 
price behavior surrounding repurchase announcements. Section 3 summarizes 
the work comparing repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms. Other
14 http://www.freeedgar.com/connpanies/index.htm.
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research related to repurchasing activity is reviewed in Section 4, and 
conclusions are contained in Section 5.
Chapter 3 is divided into four sections. In Section 1, propositions 
related to open market repurchases are developed. Likewise, Section 2 
develops the tender offer repurchasing propositions. In Section 3, Proposition 
8 argues that the perceived undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms. 
Three censored regression models used to validate Propositions 1 through 8 
are presented in Section 4.
Chapter 4 has three sections. Section 1 details the procedures followed 
in constructing the sample of 1,598 firms. In Section 2, descriptive statistics 
and the correlation matrix of important variables are presented and discussed. 
Section 3 examines the regression results for the three models.
Chapter 5 is divided into two sections. Section 1 reviews the eight 
propositions and summarizes the evidence related to each proposition. 
Section 2 points out limitations of this study and provides suggestions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the existing body of literature related to share 
repurchases. The focus of this chapter is to relate the existing literature to the 
proposed factors that determine a company's repurchasing behavior.
The chapter contains five sections. Section 1 reviews theoretical 
justifications for share repurchases. Section 2 examines share price behavior 
surrounding repurchase announcements. Section 3 summarizes the work 
comparing repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms. Section 4 covers 
other research related to repurchases, and Section 5 contains conclusions.
Section 1: Theoretical Justification for 
Share Repurchases
A brief listing and summary of the relevant research justifying share 
repurchases is found in Exhibit 2-1 in the appendix.
Bierman and West (1966) examine the effects of share repurchases and 
cash dividends on the value of the firm. They argue that the sole benefit of 
distributing cash through a stock repurchase is a reduction of taxes for 
shareholders. The assumptions of their model are that investors have 
homogeneous tax rates and tax bases, that investors know the breakdown
13
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between cash dividends and share repurchases, and that net income available 
to common equity holders is a perpetuity. Bierman and West demonstrate that 
if capital gains tax rates are lower than ordinary tax rates, the value of the firm 
is maximized by distributing cash to shareholders solely through repurchases.
Elton and Gruber (1968) extend the work of Bierman and West (1966) 
by first considering transaction costs in the model. The researchers point out 
that the tax benefits of a repurchase can be offset by an increase in transaction 
costs. The implication is that some companies will find a cash dividend 
strategy optimal, while others will find a stock repurchase strategy optimal. 
Elton and Gruber also relax the assumption of homogeneous shareholders and 
develop three implications. First, some shareholders will prefer cash dividends 
and others will prefer repurchases due to differences in the cost basis of the 
stock and marginal tax rates. Second, total transaction costs associated with 
the repurchase will decrease because only shareholders selling stock will incur 
brokerage commissions. Third, corporations do not have to force a blanket 
cash flow policy on shareholders under a repurchase plan. Shareholders can 
choose their personal cash flow pattern.
Vermaelen (1984) analyzes tender offers in a signaling framework. He 
determines that management’s primary incentives for signaling the market are 
to prevent takeovers and to increase the value of their stock options. The three 
information factors that he derives and tests are the tender premium, the target
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fraction repurchased, and the amount of insider ownership. He finds that these 
three factors are positively related to the firm’s announcement period return.
Ofer and Thakor (1987) develop a signaling model that applies to 
relatively small firms whose management’s compensation varies directly with 
the company’s stock price. The authors consider both share repurchases and 
dividend increases as signaling devices available to management. They argue 
that the market should respond more favorably to repurchase announcements 
than dividend increases because false signals sent via repurchase 
announcements are shown to be more costly to management than false signals 
sent through dividend increases. Their model also supports the notion of a 
post-repurchase price decline. Stock prices are shown to decrease at the 
expiration of a tender offer because the firm is indirectly assessed exiting 
shareholders’ transaction costs.
Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989) develop a model in which 
management uses share repurchases as a takeover defense. In their model, 
management is concerned with both job security and maintaining the market 
value of the firm. The repurchase announcement conveys the message that 
management believes the share price is too low. If management signals 
falsely, the firm will overpay for repurchased shares and the value of the firm 
will decrease.
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Talmor and Titman (1990) argue that cash distributions made through a 
share repurchase program are preferred to dividend distributions, even if 
capital gains are taxed at ordinary rates. The main advantage of the 
repurchase program is that participating shareholders are able to use the 
stock’s basis to shelter some or all of the cash distribution from taxes. If the 
firm instead distributed cash to shareholders through dividends, the entire 
distribution would be taxed. However, the authors argue that if tax rates are 
expected to increase, the stock’s basis deduction is more valuable in the future 
and shareholders will prefer dividends to share repurchases in the current 
period.
Hausch and Seward (1993) conclude that high-quality firms will 
distinguish themselves from low-quality firms by repurchasing shares. False 
signaling is discouraged by higher costs associated with the decision to 
repurchase.
Persons (1994) develops a model of repurchasing shares through a 
tender offer in which the firm chooses between either the Dutch auction method 
or the fixed price method. The author concludes that the Dutch auction method 
is a better takeover deterrent and that the fixed price method provides a more 
powerful undervaluation signal.
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that an open market share 
repurchase plan creates an option for the company. The plan gives 
management the option to enter the market whenever management believes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the firm’s stock is undervalued. This theory relies on market inefficiency and 
the ability of management to determine the "true” stock price. Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen find that announcement period returns are positively related to the 
volatility of the company’s stock price and the number of shares authorized for 
repurchase, and negatively related to the correlation coefficient between the 
company's stock return and the market’s return.19 The authors encourage 
companies to initiate open market share repurchase plans in order to capitalize 
on any possible future mispricing.
Persons (1997) develops a signaling model for tender offers that 
incorporates heterogeneous shareholder reservation values. He argues that 
firms must overpay on occasion for their shares because they face an upward 
sloping supply curve, not a perfectly elastic one. He also concludes that tender 
offers are used to signal large information asymmetries and dividends are used 
to signal small ones.
In summary, distributing cash through repurchases would not affect the 
value of the firm if markets were perfect and taxes were non-existent. Bierman 
and West (1966) relax the no tax assumption and theorize that the only benefit 
of repurchases over dividends is that repurchases are taxed at lower capital 
gains rates. Vermaelen (1961 and 1984) and Dann (1981) conclude that
5 The correlation coefficient is a proxy for the relationship between the "true* value and market 
value of the company's stock. Intuitively, if R-squared were one, the market return would fully 
explain the firm's return and inside information would be useless. In this case, the option would 
be worthless.
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repurchase announcements are generally used by firms as an undervaluation 
signal. Ofer and Thakor (1987), Hausch and Seward (1993), and Persons 
(1994 and 1997) all rely on the existence of asymmetric information in justifying 
repurchasing activity. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) argue that signaling the 
market is not the primary reason for many open market share repurchase 
plans. They believe that management benefits long-term shareholders by 
purchasing shares in the market when the shares are undervalued.
Section 2: Repurchase Announcement 
Effects on Share Prices
Section 2 is divided into two subsections. Subsection 2.1 reviews the 
literature on the effects tender offer and open market repurchase 
announcements have on share prices. Subsection 2.2 reviews the literature on 
the effects targeted share repurchases (TSRs) have on share prices.
Subsection 2.1: Tender Offer and 
Open Market Repurchases
The empirical research related to share price effects of repurchase 
announcements is extensive. A brief listing and summary of the relevant 
articles is contained in Exhibit 2-2.1 in the appendix.
Stewart (1976) measures repurchasing activity by examining changes in 
shares outstanding from one year to the next. Any company that repurchased 
more than .25% of its stock is categorized as a repurchasing firm. He 
compares the indexed annual returns of repurchasing and non-repurchasing
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firms using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Rank Test. He finds 
repurchasing firms have discemibiy higher rates of return over both the three- 
and four-year periods following the repurchase. Stewart’s research supports 
the contention that management is able to determine when the company’s 
stock is undervalued and will repurchase it to increase shareholder returns. 
The results imply that the market inefficiently factors repurchase information 
into stock prices.
Masulis (1980) finds that stock prices of firms announcing a cash tender 
offer increase an average of 16.35% over the two-day announcement period. 
He attributes his findings in part to
1) a reduction in shareholders’ personal taxes by converting dividends 
into capital gains,
2) a beneficial increase in financial leverage,
3) an expropriation of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, and
4) a wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders due 
to non-tendering shareholders’ relatively higher costs associated with 
tendering.16
He also finds that on average only oversubscribed issues that are 
purchased pro rata decline in price at the expiration date of the tender offer.
16 If the tender price is greater than the true price, wealth will be transferred from non-tendering 
to tendering shareholders. Shareholders with high tendering cost (reinvestment transaction 
costs, high marginal tax rates, etc.) and significant tendering constraints wiN not claim their 
share of this tender premium.
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An oversubscribed issue indicates that investors believe the offer is too 
generous, and the expiration price typically drops if management announces a 
pro rata repurchase. A positive signal is sent to the market if management 
decides to repurchase all tendered shares, and the stock price typically does 
not decline.
Dann (1981) investigates the expropriation hypothesis that says wealth 
is transferred from senior security holders to shareholders through 
repurchases. He calculates the average rates of return for common stock as 
well as for convertible and non-convertible preferred stocks and bonds. His 
findings suggest that during the announcement period, non-tendering common 
shareholder wealth increases by about 15%, and convertible security holder 
wealth increases by about 3%. Non-convertible security holder wealth is 
insignificantly affected by the tender offer announcement. Dann concludes that 
repurchases do not transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders.
Vermaelen (1981) examines the share price behavior of firms that 
repurchase their shares in the open market or via a tender offer. He uses 
event study methodology and finds that the average abnormal return for an 
open market repurchase announcement is 3.62%. He also finds that tender 
offer announcements deliver an average abnormal return of 13.9% during the 
announcement period. Vermaelen’s specific findings that support the 
information-signaling hypothesis are as follows:
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1) He finds that 60% of the tender offer abnormal return variance is 
explained by the size of the tender offer premium, level of insider 
ownership, and the fraction repurchased. These three factors are all 
positively related to the abnormal return and send positive signals to 
the market.
2) Most of the firms repurchasing shares during the period 1962-1977 
were small firms, which are typically followed by fewer analysts. 
These firms are more likely than larger firms to have undervalued 
shares and thus would have a greater need to use a tender offer.
3) If management uses repurchases to signal investors, then cash flow 
per share would be expected to increase in subsequent years. 
Earnings per share are used as a proxy for cash flow per share and 
are found to be abnormally high for the years following a tender offer.
Barclay and Smith (1988) theorize that specialists increase a stock's bid- 
ask spread when management enters the market on behalf of the firm. The 
increase in the spread decreases the liquidity of the stock and lowers its price. 
The researchers use an event study design to test their theory and conclude 
that spreads increase discemibly following open market repurchase 
announcements.
Contrary to Barclay and Smith (1988), Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti 
(1994); Wiggins (1994); and Miller and McConnell (1995) all report no change 
in bid-ask spreads subsequent to repurchase announcements. They use daily
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data, unlike Barclay and Smith who use annual data, and they find that the 
percent spread (ratio of spread to stock price) increases in the pre­
announcement period but not in the post-announcement period. The pre- 
announcement increase is attributable to a decline in the share price. They 
find consistent results using both univariate and multivariate tests.
Natter and Mitchell (1989) analyze stock repurchase announcements in 
the two weeks following the October 1987 stock market crash. They find that 
firms that announced an open market repurchase plan earned an average 
abnormal return of 3.45% during the announcement period. They also 
compare the post-announcement returns of firms that actually repurchased 
shares to those firms that failed to repurchase shares. They find no evidence 
that the market punishes firms that announce a repurchase and then fail to 
actually repurchase shares. Their study supports the theory that repurchase 
announcements convey management’s message that the company's stock is 
undervalued.
Pugh and Jahera (1990) find a positive relationship between the tender 
offer announcement period abnormal return and the change in the debt asset 
ratio, holding other factors constant. This supports the leverage hypothesis 
that says that tender offers move the firm toward their optimal capital structure. 
The authors argue that tender offers transfer wealth from the government to 
shareholders through tax reductions.
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Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) examine 221 tender offers that took 
place in the 1962-1986 period. They employ a trading rule of purchasing a 
tender firm's stock if it is less than or equal to 97% of the tender price, 
tendering it, and selling any excess shares in the open market after expiration. 
The results indicate an average risk-adjusted return of about 9% during an 
investment period of less than thirty days. A possible reason for this anomaly 
is that “repurchase tender offers are relatively rare events, ” according to the 
authors. They also calculate risk-adjusted returns for firms over the twenty-two 
months following the tender offer. During this period, small firms earn an 
average excess return of 24%. This result is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the market underestimates the information released in tender offers. 
Therefore, they conclude that firm's employing a tender offer generally buy 
undervalued shares.
Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that a Dutch auction tender offer is a 
weaker signaling device than a fixed-price tender offer, and that large firms use 
the Dutch auction method more frequently. The authors argue that large firms 
are followed by more analysts and have a smaller chance of being 
undervalued. The researchers find that if insiders' wealth is at risk, higher 
announcement period excess returns are generally earned.
Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) test the hypothesis that management 
uses tender offers to signal the market of forthcoming positive information. 
Using two methods for predicting earnings, the researchers find that following
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tender offers, earnings are typically above predictions. There is also a positive 
correlation between the announcement period abnormal return and the 
prediction error of earnings. They also discover that market risk generally 
decreases for firms announcing tender offers. This change in risk is negatively 
correlated with the announcement period abnormal return.
Banov’s (1991) study is similar to Dann, Masulis, and Mayer’s (1991) 
study except that he analyzes earnings and risk changes of firms announcing 
an open market repurchase instead of a tender offer repurchase. He finds that 
earnings per share are generally higher than expected in the announcement 
year and risk generally decreases following the announcement. Also, 
regression analysis indicates that announcement returns are positively 
correlated with unexpected earnings and negatively correlated with risk 
changes. Comparing the findings of Dann, Masulis, and Mayers to the findings 
of Bartov, tender offers provide stronger evidence of earnings changes and a 
larger reduction in systematic risk than open market repurchase 
announcements. Both studies support the information-signaling hypothesis.
Brown & Ryngaert (1992) find that tendering rates are significantly 
higher for inter-firm tender offers relative to self-tender offers. They argue that 
accepting stock from another company is more costly than paying the capital 
gains tax for many shareholders.
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Howe, He, and Kao (1992) find no evidence that Jensen’s free cash flow 
theory explains the market reaction to announced tender offers or specially 
designated dividends. Low-Q (over-investing) firms are expected to have 
higher announcement period returns than high-Q (under-investing) firms. They 
are puzzled that the free cash flow theory was found by Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989) to play an important role in dividend increases, but not in their study.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) perform a study similar to 
Stewart (1976). They analyze 1,239 firms announcing an open market share 
repurchase plan from 1980-1990. They find that these firms earn an average 
abnormal return of 12.1% over the four-year period following the 
announcement. They also break the sample into five quintiles according to the 
book-to-market ratio and find that firms in the highest quintile (value stocks) 
averaged a 45.3% abnormal return over the four-year period following the 
announcement. No positive drift in prices is apparent for non-value stocks. 
The researchers draw two main conclusions from their results:
1. Companies with high book-to-market value ratios are more likely to 
repurchase stock due to undervaluation, and
2. The market inappropriately factors open market share repurchase 
announcements into stock prices.
Ratner, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos (1996) argue that institutional 
investors are better informed than individual investors are, and as a company’s 
institutional ownership increases, its stock price more accurately reflects all
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publicly and privately available information. The researchers find that a larger 
tender offer announcement period abnormal return is associated with lower 
levels of institutional ownership.
Chhachhi and Davidson (1997) find that companies announcing tender 
offers typically have larger abnormal returns than companies announcing 
specially designated dividends. One explanation for this is that shareholders 
place a higher value on repurchases due to lower capital gains tax rates. The 
researchers do find that the difference in the abnormal returns narrows 
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
In summary, there is a strong body of empirical research that supports 
the information-signaling motive for stock repurchases. Vermaelen (1981) and 
Dann (1981) find that tender offer announcements send stronger 
undervaluation signals than open market repurchase announcements. 
According to Vermaelen (1981), firms announcing tender offers earn an 
average abnormal return of 13.9% during the announcement period. Firms 
announcing an open market repurchase are typically characterized by negative 
abnormal returns prior to the announcement and positive announcement period 
abnormal returns that average 3.6%. Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) and 
Bartov (1991) find that firms announcing either type of repurchase program 
have positive earnings surprises in subsequent years. Stewart (1976) and 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that the market tends to 
underestimate the value of an open market repurchase announcement. They
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find that firms announcing open market repurchases earn positive abnormal 
returns over the subsequent five-year period. These results indicate that 
tender offer and open market share repurchases increase shareholder wealth.
Subsection 2.2: Targeted Share 
Repurchases (TSRs)
A listing of the relevant articles and their major findings is found in 
Exhibit 2-2.2 in the appendix.
Bradley and Wakeman (1983) find that TSRs from insiders and small 
investors typically benefit shareholders. The authors hypothesize that TSRs 
involving insiders send positive signals to the market if insiders are perceived 
as simply rebalancing their portfolio and if the company is perceived as 
demonstrating confidence in the stock by buying it. The main benefit of TSRs 
from small investors comes from a decrease in the total cost of mailing dividend 
checks, quarterly reports, and other items to shareholders. The authors also 
analyze block repurchases from single shareholders (often called “greenmail”) 
and find that from event day -1 to 30, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
-3.8%. Block repurchases that are associated with the end of a takeover 
attempt elicit a drop of 12.5% in the share price. This finding suggests that 
management is not acting in shareholders' best interest by repurchasing large 
blocks of shares. Management appears to be eliminating competition for the 
control of the firm’s assets by “buying out” large shareholders that have both 
the power and incentive to discipline management.
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Dann and DeAngelo (1983) investigate the effects that standstill 
agreements and TSRs have on non-participating shareholders. During the 
announcement period, they calculate that the mean share price reduction is 
4.52% for companies with standstill agreements and 1.76% for companies with 
TSRs. These results cast doubt on whether management is acting in 
shareholder’s best interest by negotiating standstill agreements and block 
repurchases.
Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) investigate target companies’ returns 
around large block purchases by six so-called "raiders” (Carl Icahn, Irwin 
Jacobs, Carl Lindner, David Murdock, Victor Posner and Charles Bluhdom). A 
subset of their sample includes TSRs of the raider's shares. The authors 
calculate the average abnormal return for target companies during the 
purchase-to-repurchase period by summing the average abnormal return on 
three significant event dates; the announcement day of the original block 
purchase, the day that the raider demands repurchase, and the repurchase 
announcement day. The purchase-to-repurchase abnormal return is 3.2%. 
Holdemess and Sheehan conclude that shareholders benefit from the initial 
investment by the raider.
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) analyze the share price behavior of target 
firms during the purchase-to-repurchase period. Their study is similar to the 
Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) study except they use a larger sample (77 
verses 12). Klein and Rosenfeld calculate a 6.45% abnormal return by
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summing the original purchase announcement period abnormal return and the 
repurchase announcement period abnormal return. However, a -3.27% 
abnormal return occurs during the two-day repurchase announcement period. 
Klein and Rosenfeld conclude that while the positive abnormal return during 
the purchase-to-repurchase period supports the shareholder interest 
hypothesis, the negative abnormal return during the repurchase announcement 
period does not support it.
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) study the turnover rates of companies 
engaged in TSRs and find that these firms have above average management 
turnover rates in the year following the repurchase. They argue that if the 
repurchase were in shareholders' best interest, management turnover rates 
would be insignificantly different from average turnover rates. They also find 
that firms paying greenmail typically earn positive abnormal returns prior to a 
change in management. This finding eliminates poor share price performance 
as a motive for dismissal and places more emphasis on the greenmail 
payment.
In summary, TSRs generally increase shareholder wealth during the 
announcement period if the repurchase is from insiders or small 
shareholders.17 Controversy exists over whether TSRs from large shareholders 
is in a remaining shareholder's best interest. During the announcement period,
17 Bradley and Wakeman (1083).
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shareholder wealth decreases abnormally, however abnormal returns are 
positive when calculated from the purchase-to-repurchase period.1* Klein and 
Rosenfeld (1988) argue that since management turnover rates are higher than 
normal following TSRs, shareholders must believe that TSRs do not maximize 
shareholder wealth.
Section 3: Operating and Financial Characteristics 
of Share Repurchasing Firms
Research on the important characteristics that differentiate repurchasing 
firms from non-repurchasing firms is limited to four studies. A listing and 
summary of the four studies is found in Exhibit 2-3 in the appendix.
Young (1969) compares financial, operating, and security market 
conditions of 227 firms that repurchased 1% or more common stock to a group 
of similar firms that repurchased no common stock during any year between 
1960-1967. He finds no distinct liquidity differences between the two groups, 
but he does find that repurchasing firms typically use less financial leverage 
and have greater debt service ability prior to the repurchase. Young also 
discovers that repurchasing firms have relatively lower total asset growth rates. 
This finding suggests that they have relatively fewer investments, and 
therefore, repurchase stock with their excess cash. Another distinct difference 
between the two groups is in sales growth rates and operating income growth
18 Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) and Klein and Rosenfeld (1988).
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rates prior to and during the year of repurchase. Repurchasing firms have 
lower growth rates in sales and operating income, and Young suggests that 
they are masking difficulties by repurchasing stock in hopes of maintaining 
earnings per share. Alternatively, management may determine that the stock 
price is low due to the poor operating results and may view this as an 
opportunity to repurchase stock at a reduced price. Young also finds that 
repurchasing firms have lower price/eamings ratios both before and after the 
repurchase, reinforcing his idea that the firm is repurchasing stock at reduced 
prices.
Norgaard and Norgaard (1974) define a repurchasing firm as holding 8% 
or more of its outstanding stock in the treasury, and a non-repurchasing firm as 
holding no treasury stock. Their sample includes sixty repurchasing firms and 
sixty non-repurchasing firms. They first compare the means of various 
operating and financial ratios of repurchasing firms to non-repurchasing firms. 
Repurchasing firms have lower price/eamings ratios, higher book-to-market 
ratios, and higher dividend yields. Repurchasing firms also hold less cash but 
have higher inventory and/or receivables balances. Unlike Young (1969), 
Norgaard and Norgaard find that repurchasing firms use more debt than non- 
repurchasing firms. They conclude that repurchasing companies are inferior to 
non-repurchasing companies and advise "financial managers to reexamine 
their actions or contemplated actions in repurchasing in light of both theory and
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practice.” Norgaard and Norgaard also use discriminant function analysis and 
find that the companies can be divided into two distinct groups.
Finnerty (1975) identifies the primary characteristics that distinguish 
equity repurchasing companies from equity issuing companies. He uses both 
univariate and multivariate models and has a final sample size of 715 firms that 
issued or repurchased equity in 1972. He concludes that firms issuing equity 
generally have more financial leverage and lower dividends than firms 
repurchasing stock. These results suggest that repurchasing firms have 
relatively fewer investments. Finnerty also uses factor analysis and concludes 
that the firms come from distinct groups.
Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992) use both univariate and 
multivariate models to compare repurchasing firms, non-repurchasing firms, 
open market repurchasing firms, and tender offer repurchasing firms. 
Repurchasing firms are classified as announcing a repurchase program 
between 1983-1986. The researchers find that repurchasing firms use 
relatively less financial leverage, have less liquidity, have higher dividend 
yields, and have higher profitability ratios. Firms that announce a tender offer, 
relative to firms announcing an open market repurchase, are smaller in terms of 
sales, number of shares outstanding, and total assets. The researchers use a 
multiple discriminant model that indicates that the firms can be accurately 
classified.
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In summary, there is general agreement that repurchasing and non­
repurchasing firms have significantly different financial and operating 
characteristics. The studies generally characterize repurchasing firms as using 
less financial leverage19 and having lower stock prices20 than non-repurchasing 
firms.
Section 4: Other Research
A listing and summary of other research related to share repurchases is 
found in Exhibit 2-4 in the appendix.
Austin (1969) looks at the repurchasing activity over the 1961-1967 
period. He finds that
1) the number of times a repurchasing company entered the market to 
repurchase shares ranged from 1 to 68 times,
2) the percentage of total shares that were repurchased varied from 1 % 
to 85%, and
3) the main reasons for repurchase were to provide shares for stock 
option programs and to avoid takeovers.
Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1981) survey chief financial officers 
(CFOs) and find that the two most common reasons for repurchasing stock are 
for investment purposes and to acquire shares for employee bonuses and/or
19 Young (1969); Finnerty (1975); and Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992).
20 Young (1969); Norgaaid and Norgaard (1974); and Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
34
stock options. Many of the CFOs view share repurchases as detrimental to the 
firm’s capital structure and do not view them as substitutes for dividends.
Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar's (1989) survey results indicate that 
management’s primary reason for repurchasing stock is undervaluation. 
Managers also believe premiums increase 1) as management's confidence in 
future earnings increase, 2) as the fraction of shares repurchased increase, 3) 
when debt is used to repurchase the shares, and 4) when the repurchase is in 
response to a takeover attempt.
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1989) show that repurchasing shares by issuing 
transferable put rights (TPRs) ensures that shareholders with the lowest 
reservation prices tender their shares first. This leads to maximum tax 
efficiency and decreases the probability of a takeover by eliminating 
shareholders with the lowest reservation prices.
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991) use a Monte Carlo simulation to compare two 
relatively new stock repurchase methods (Dutch auction and TPRs) to the 
traditional fixed-price tender offer, assuming heterogeneous shareholders. 
They find that Dutch auctions and TPRs are more efficient than fixed-price 
tender offers. An efficient repurchase is defined as one where all remaining 
shareholders place a higher value on the firm than the tendering shareholders. 
Dutch auctions and TPRs do a better job of maximizing the value of the firm 
than fixed-price tender offers. The researchers also show that Dutch auctions 
are the best repurchasing method to deter takeovers.
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Gay, Kale and Noe (1996) develop and test two models dealing with 
heterogeneous shareholders involved in a Dutch auction repurchase. They 
predict and find evidence indicating that tender offer premiums are negatively 
related to the level of bidding competition and that tender offer premiums 
increase as the number of shares sought increases.
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) highlight the tax advantage of share 
repurchases and acquisitions over cash dividend disbursements. They 
accumulate the total amount of dollars spent on acquisitions, dividends, and 
share repurchases from 1977-1987. The real growth rates for the entire ten- 
year period in dollars distributed through acquisitions, share repurchases, and 
dividends were 900%, 824%, and 61.3%, respectively. There was a sharp 
decrease in repurchases during the first quarter of 1987 that is possibly 
attributable to the narrowing of the gap between capital gains tax rates and 
ordinary tax rates resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Also, Casey, 
Anderson, Mesak, and Dickens (1997) find evidence that companies in certain 
industries changed their dividend payout ratios as a result of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986.
Denis (1990) investigates target firms that pay out cash to shareholders 
through a special dividend or a share repurchase as a means of defense. The 
announcement of a share repurchase is associated with a negative abnormal 
return, and the announcement of a special dividend is associated with a 
positive abnormal return. Firms remaining independent, generally have
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positive CARs during the contest period regardless of the defensive payout 
method used. Firms that maintain their independence undergo msyor changes 
in capital, asset, and ownership structures in the year following the takeover 
contest.
Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996) adjust the dividend yield for share 
repurchases and find that it is currently low by historical standards. They note 
that low dividend yields have historically been associated with lackluster 
returns in the stock market, and they predict lackluster stock returns based on 
this measure.
Section 5: Conclusions
Share repurchasing can be used for many reasons such as altering a 
firm’s capital structure or signaling the market of undervaluation. The 
consensus view in the literature is that tender offers are used as a signaling 
device. Management signals the market in order to increase shareholder 
wealth.
Unlike tender offers, there is a lack of consensus as to the primary 
reason(s) for open market repurchases. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) suggest that large firms use an open market repurchase 
plan to restructure and that small firms use it as a signaling device. Ikenberry 
and Vermaelen (1996) argue that open market repurchase plans are instituted
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in order to give companies the option to repurchase stock whenever 
management believes it is undervalued.
Some of the important characteristics of repurchasing firms relative to 
non-repurchasing firms differ depending on either the time period analyzed 
and/or the definitions used for repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms. For 
instance, Norgaard and Norgaard (1974) find that repurchasing firms are 
relatively less profitable, while Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan (1992) find that 
repurchasing firms are relatively more profitable.
Much of the empirical work in the 1980s supports the information- 
signaling hypothesis, especially for tender offers. However, Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996) argue that signaling the market is not the primary motivation 
for open market repurchases. The present study identifies and empirically 
tests the important factors that influence a firm’s repurchasing activity.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY OF PROPOSITIONS’ 
VALIDATION
Share repurchase activity varies widely among firms. In this study, a 
firm’s repurchase activity is measured by the amount of cash distributed to 
shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the 
firm's average market capitalization (RCAP). Market capitalization equals the 
number of shares outstanding multiplied by the firm’s share price. Section 1 of 
this chapter discusses factors that motivate firms to repurchase shares through 
the open market.
In Section 2 of this chapter, two motivations for repurchasing stock 
through a tender offer are discussed. Prior research indicates that the primary 
motivation for repurchasing shares through a tender offer is perceived 
undervaluation, however, this study proposes that financial leverage plays an 
important role in determining the size of the tender offer. For example, a firm 
that perceives substantial undervaluation will not be able to use a tender offer 
unless it has excess debt capacity.
Prior research indicates that the perceived undervaluation motive is 
stronger for smaller firms, and in Section 3 this motivation is discussed in
38
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detail. Three censored regression models are presented in Section 4 for the 
purpose of validating the developed propositions.
Section 1: Propositions Related to 
Ooen Market Repurchases
The basic elements of the Open Market Repurchase Model are 
perceived undervaluation, financial leverage, cash inflows, investment cash 
outflows, and the dispersion of ownership. The Open Market Repurchase 
Model (Equations 1-a and 1-b on page 50) is presented in Section 4 of this 
chapter and is used to test Propositions 1 through 5.
Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.
In a survey by Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989), management 
indicates that undervaluation is an important motivation for repurchasing 
shares. If management believes the company’s stock is undervalued, 
repurchasing it makes sense. If management is correct, the repurchase will 
benefit long-term shareholders.
The price-to-book value ratio is used as a proxy for undervaluation and 
is measured at the beginning of each firm’s fiscal year. A repurchase often 
sends a positive signal to investors, who typically respond by increasing the
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firm’s price and therefore cause the price-to-book value ratio to increase. The 
repurchase reduces or eliminates any undervaluation. Measuring the price-to- 
book value ratio at the beginning of the year eliminates the positive feedback 
effect that repurchases have on the price-to-book value ratio.
Industry characteristics influence a firm’s price-to-book value ratio. For 
example, firms in the computer software service industry typically have 
significantly higher price-to-book value ratios than firms in the auto 
manufacturing industry. Much of this difference is due to software service firms 
having substantially more human assets than the auto manufacturers, and 
these human assets do not increase a firm’s book value. If industry effects are 
not controlled, auto manufacturers will typically look undervalued relative to 
software service firms. In order to control for industry effects, each firm’s price- 
to-book value ratio is normalized by subtracting the industry’s estimated mean 
and dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation. Controlling for 
industry effects allows a firm to appear undervalued or overvalued relative to 
industry peers. The normalized price-to-book value ratio (PBN) included in the 
Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively impact RCAP.
Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are 
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in 
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.
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The trade-off model suggests that as debt is added to the capital 
structure, the value of the firm increases up to a point and then decreases 
beyond that point.21 As the model suggests, the main advantage of debt is its 
tax deductibility, and the main disadvantages of debt are agency and financial 
distress costs. In theory, a firm’s optimal capital structure is the one that 
balances the marginal benefit of debt with the marginal cost of debt Firms with 
low debt-to-asset ratios are expected to benefit from more debt and/or less 
equity in their capital structures. One way for a firm to increase the relative 
amount of debt is to repurchase stock.
The proxy for the financial leverage motive is a firm’s debt-to-asset ratio 
measured at the beginning of each firm’s fiscal year. Measuring this ratio at 
the beginning of the year is necessary because stock repurchases have an 
impact on financial leverage. A firm repurchasing stock in order to increase its 
financial leverage will not appear as under-leveraged after the repurchase. 
Therefore, measuring the debt-to-asset ratio at the beginning of the year 
eliminates the feedback effect the repurchase has on the debt-to-asset ratio.
Industry characteristics influence the amount of financial leverage a firm 
can employ. For example, firms in industries that have a large amount of 
operating risk (durable goods manufacturers) will generally use less debt than 
firms in industries that have little operating risk (utility companies). In order to
21 See Brigham and Gapenski (pp. 636-640) for a more complete discussion of the trade-off 
model.
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account for industry effects, a firm's debt-to-asset ratio is normalized by 
subtracting the industry's estimated mean and dividing by the industry's 
estimated standard deviation. The normalized debt-to-asset ratio (DN) 
included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively 
impact RCAP.
Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market The larger a firm's cash inflows, the greater tee need to distribute cash 
to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
One of the benefits of distributing cash to shareholders through a 
repurchase is that only shareholders desiring current income receive cash and 
pay taxes. Alternatively, a dividend forces cash, taxes, and transaction costs 
on shareholders that do not desire a cash distribution. Furthermore, dividends 
are taxed at ordinary rates, and repurchases are taxed at potentially lower 
capital gains rates. Therefore, companies with higher cash inflows are 
expected to distribute more cash to shareholders through open market 
repurchases.
The cash flow-to-total asset ratio is used as a proxy for a firm’s relative 
cash inflows. Cash flows are defined as net income plus non-cash expenses. 
This variable is normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean and
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dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation. The normalization 
process controls for industry effects. The normalized cash flow-to-total asset 
ratio (CFN) included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to 
positively impact RCAP.
Proposition 4:
Firms that have tower investment cash outflows are motivated to 
repurchase a larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market The smaller the Arm's investment cash outflows, the greater the need 
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant.
Higher growth firms need cash to finance asset acquisitions, and 
internally generated cash is a cheaper source of financing than externally 
generated cash due to floatation costs. Donaldson’s (1961) survey of 
corporations suggests that internally generated cash is the preferred means for 
financing new projects. The firm's compound annual growth rate in sales 
calculated over the preceding five-year period is employed to measure a firm’s 
historical and future investment cash outflows. High historical growth rates 
indicate less cash was available for repurchasing stock and if past growth rates 
are good predictors of future growth rates, imply cash will be retained in order 
to finance future growth. The compound annual growth rate in sales (G) 
included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to negatively 
impact RCAP.
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Proposition 5:
Finns that have mom diverse ownership structures will repurchase a 
larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open market in order to 
reduce agency costs. Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency 
costs by forcing the company to rely mom heavily on external financing.
Proposition 5 addresses the agency conflict between shareholders and 
management. The proxy for the diversity of Ownership is a firm’s book value of 
total assets measured at the end of each firm’s fiscal year. Larger firms 
typically have more owners and thus higher agency costs. Distributing cash to 
shareholders through repurchases forces firms to go to capital markets more 
frequently, and thus undergo the scrutiny of investment bankers and 
prospective investors. Rozeff (1982) finds that the number of shareholders 
positively impacts the dividend payout ratio.22 The natural log of total assets 
(LTA) included in the Open Market Repurchase Model is expected to positively 
impact RCAP.
22 Rozeff uses the total number of shareholders to proxy for the dispersion of ownership in his 
study. Total assets is used here instead of the total number of shareholders because of fewer 
missing data points. The two variables are highly correlated though (.71).
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Section 2: Propositions Related to 
Tender Offer Repurchases
Eleven of the 1,598 firms in the sample used a tender offer to 
repurchase shares during the fiscal year. One alternative for dealing with the 
limited number of tender offer observations is to include a slope dummy 
variable and intercept dummy variables representing tender offer firms in the 
Open Market Repurchase Model. However, in order to do this, one has to 
assume that the error variances for tender offer repurchasing firms and open 
market repurchasing firms are equal. This assumption is not reasonable. The 
dependent variable in the Open Market Repurchase Model, RCAP, has a 
standard deviation for tender offer repurchasing firms that is over eleven times 
greater than the standard deviation of RCAP for open market repurchasing 
firms. Therefore, a separate censored regression model is set up for tender 
offer firms. The Tender Offer Repurchase Model (Equations 2-a and 2-b on 
page 50) is presented in Section 4 and is used to test Propositions 6 and 7.
Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender 
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of 
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.
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Firms will likely prefer a tender offer to an open market repurchase if the 
firm’s stock is perceived by management to be substantially undervalued 
because a tender offer allows the company to rapidly repurchase a large 
quantity of stock. Ikenberry (1980) finds that tender offer announcements send 
a much stronger undervaluation signal to investors than open market 
repurchase announcements. Firms repurchasing through a tender offer pay an 
average premium of 22% and thus are thought to be undervalued by at least 
the amount of the premium. The price-to-book value ratio normalized by 
industry (PBN) is included in the Tender Offer Repurchase Model and is 
expected to negatively impact RCAP.
Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a 
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
Firms repurchasing through a tender offer typically buy back about 15% 
of their equity. This large equity repurchase substantially changes the firm’s 
capital structure. Managers believing that the firm has too little debt can 
rapidly increase financial leverage by using a tender offer repurchase. 
However, it is doubtful that the benefit of more financial leverage will offset the 
large tender offer premium. Therefore, it is likely that perceived undervaluation 
is the primary motivation for a tender offer and that excess debt capacity
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impacts the size of repurchase. The debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry 
(ON) is included in the Tender Offer Repurchase Model and is expected to 
negatively impact RCAP.23
Section 3: Small Firms and the 
Undervaluation Motive
The basic elements of the Small Firm Undervaluation Model are
perceived undervaluation, financial leverage, cash inflows, investment cash
outflows, and the dispersion of ownership. This model differs from the Open
Market Repurchase Model in that an interaction term between firm size and
perceived undervaluation is included. The Small Firm Undervaluation Model
(Equations 3-a on page 50 and 3-b on page 51) is presented in Section 4 of
this chapter and is used to test Propositions 8.
Proposition 8:
The undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for smaller 
firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts and management is 
therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen’s (1995) findings suggest that 
smaller firms are motivated to repurchase stock due to undervaluation. 
Specifically, they find that small firms had significantly higher abnormal returns
23 The cash inflow, investment cash outflow, and agency cost motives are not expected to 
motivate Anns to distribute cash to shareholdere through a tender offer because a dividend 
distribution is more efficient. The large tender offer premium is expected to outweigh any 
benefits derived from these three motivations.
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than large firms over a four-year period following an open market repurchase 
announcement. They conclude that a strong motivation for announcing a 
repurchase program for small firms is undervaluation.
In order to account for the possibility that smaller firms are more inclined 
than larger firms to repurchase stock due to perceived undervaluation, 
interaction terms between a firm’s PBN and its total asset quartile are included 
as explanatory variables in the Small Firm Undervaluation Model presented in 
Section 4. Size quartiles are constructed by sorting firms according to total 
assets and then placing them in one of four total asset quartiles. TA2 is a 
dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the second total asset quartile and 
zero otherwise. TA3 (TA4) is a dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the 
third (fourth) total asset quartile and zero otherwise. In equation 3-b shown on 
page 51, 04 represents the expected change in RCAP resulting from a one 
standard deviation change in PBN for firms in total asset quartile one. fc 
represents the difference in the marginal impact of PBN between firms in total 
asset quartiles one and two. 0t (07) represents the difference in the marginal 
impact of PBN between firms in total asset quartiles one and three (one and 
four). If smaller firms have a greater tendency to repurchase stock due to 
perceived undervaluation, 07 > 0« > 0s > 0.
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Section 4: The Repurchase Models 
RCAP is a censored variable because the repurchase expenditure 
cannot fall below zero and thus does not adequately measure a non­
repurchasing firm’s aversion to repurchasing shares. It may be argued that 
firms show their aversion to repurchases by issuing equity, however this will not 
always be the case. For example, suppose a non-repurchasing firm has 
excess liquidity and a relatively high debt-to-asset ratio. This firm is unlikely to 
show its aversion to repurchases by issuing equity because this would increase 
the firm’s liquidity. This firm is more likely to distribute cash to debtors and thus 
hide its level of aversion to share repurchases.
Share repurchasing activity is measured by the amount of cash 
distributed to shareholders through share repurchases expressed as a 
percentage of the firm’s average annual market capitalization (RCAP). Simply 
regressing RCAP on a set of explanatory variables is inappropriate because 
the coefficient estimates would be biased and inconsistent due to bias in the 
error term. Heckman (1979) proposes a simple two-stage estimation process 
that generates consistent coefficient estimates. In the first stage, a probit 
model is utilized in order to estimate a hazard rate, A*, for each firm. 24 In the 
second stage, K is added to the regression model as an explanatory variable in
24 X* is a measure of the likelihood that firm i repurchases stock. Specifically, h « 
f(a+pXj)/F(a+pXj).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
order to normalize the mean of the error to zero, thus generating consistent 
estimates of the coefficient parameters. Three censored regression models are 
presented below.
Open Market Repurchase Model 
Staoe 1 Probit Model 
P i= F (Zj) = F (ao + ctiPBNi + agDNi + otaCFNi ♦ ouGi + aaLTAt) (1 -a)
Staoe 2 Regression Model
RCAP. = 30 + 31 PBNi + 02DNi + 03CFNi + 04Gi + 05LTAi + 06* i + u, (1 -b)
Tender Offer Repurchase Model 
Staoe 1 Probit Model 
Pi = F (Zi) = F (geo + aiPBNi + 012DN1) (2-a)
Stage 2 Regression Model 
RCAPi = 0o + 0iPBNi ♦  02DNi ♦  0)11 ♦  U\ (2-b)
Small Firm Undervaluation Model 
Stage 1 Probit Model 
Pi = F (Zi) = F (oto ciiTA2i ♦ a2TA3i + ajTA4t + ouPBNi +
a«(PBN,*TA2,) + a«(PBNfTA3,) + a7(PBN,TA4l) ♦ a«DN, +
a«CFNi + aioGi) (3-a)
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Staoe 2 Regression Model 
RCAP, = po + 0,TA2, + 02TA3. + fc T M  ♦ P4PBN, + 0$(PBN,*TA2i) + 
W PBN.TA3,) + Pt(PBN,-TM) ♦ 0«ON, + 0.CFN, ♦ 01OG, +
Puii + Ui @"b)
where,
P, = Estimate of the conditional probability that firm i will 
repurchase stock given PBN, ON, CFN, G, and LTA (Open 
Market Repurchase Model); PBN and DN (Tender Offer 
Repurchase Model); and TA2, TA3, TA4, PBN, PBN*TA2, 
PBN*TA3, PBN*TA4, DN, CFN, and G (Small Firm 
Undervaluation Model).
F = Cumulative normal probability function.
Zi = A continuous index number determined from firm i's PBN, 
DN, CFN, G, and LTA (Open Market Repurchase Model); 
PBN and DN (Tender Offer Repurchase Model); and TA2, 
TA3, TA4, PBN, PBN*TA2, PBNTA3, PBNTA4, DN, CFN, 
and G (Small Firm Undervaluation Model).
PBNi = Firm i’s beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio 
normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean 
and dividing by the industry's estimated standard deviation.
DNi = Firm i’s beginning of the year total debt-to-asset ratio 
normalized by subtracting the industry's estimated mean 
and dividing by the industry’s estimated standard deviation.
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CFNi = Finn i’s cash flow-to-total asset ratio normalized by
subtracting the industry’s estimated mean and dividing by
the industry's estimated standard deviation.
Gi = Firm i’s compound annual growth rate in sales calculated 
over the preceding five-year period using the average to 
average method.29
LTAi = The natural log of firm i’s book value of total assets
measured at the end of the fiscal year.
RCAPi = The amount of cash distributed to shareholders through 
share repurchases expressed as a percentage of the firm’s 
average annual market capitalization.
PBNi*TA2i = An interaction term between PBN and TA2. TA2 is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the second total 
asset quartile and zero otherwise. Total assets are 
measured at the end of the year.
PBNt*TA3, = An interaction term between PBN and TA3. TA3 is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the third total
asset quartile and zero otherwise. Total assets are 
measured at the end of the year.
PBN|*TA4( = An interaction term between PBN and TA4. TA4 is a
dummy variable coded one if the firm is in the highest total 
asset quartile and zero otherwise. Total assets are 
measured at the end of the year. 
a i = Firm i’s hazard rate, estimated from the Stage 1 Probit 
Model. This variable normalizes the mean of U\ to zero.
Ui = The error term distributed as N (0, o2).
25 The compound annual rates of change are calculated using three-year base periods. Base
periods used for the 1996 sales growth rate calculation are 1989-1991 and 1994-1996. Value
Line Investment Survey calculates and reports this growth rate.
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The Stage 1 Probit Model assumes that there is a theoretical continuous 
variable Z, which is a linear function of the explanatory variables. 
Observations on Z are not available, but high Z-values are associated with 
repurchasing firms, and low Z-values are associated with non-repurchasing 
firms. Zi represents the strength of appeal of a repurchase for firm i. Maximum 
likelihood estimation is used to estimate the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables, and the probability that firm i repurchases stock through the open 
market is directly related to Z>. Specifically, the probability is measured by the 
area under the standard normal curve from -oo to Zi.
The Stage 1 probit model and the Stage 2 regression model can be 
estimated independently or jointly. Joint estimation is accomplished by using 
the “Sampser command in TSP International Version 4.4. The method used is 
the maximization of the likelihood function. Joint estimation using the maximum 
likelihood function yields more efficient estimates. Joint estimation is used for 
the Open Market Repurchase Model and the Small Firm Undervaluation Model. 
The Tender Offer Repurchase Model equations are estimated independently 
because of a limited number of tender offer repurchasing firms.
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C H A PTER  4
DATA AND EMIPIRCAL FINDINGS
Chapter 4 is divided into three sections. Section 1 details the 
procedures followed in constructing the sample of 1,598 firms. In Section 2, 
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for important variables are 
presented and discussed. Section 3 presents the regression results for the 
three models and examines the resulting implications.
Section 1: Data
The final sample includes 1,598 firms and spans 62 industries as 
classified by Value Line Investment Survey. Table 4-1 lists the industries 
represented, the number of firms within each industry, the number of firms 
within each industry that repurchased stock, and the percentage of firms within 
each industry that repurchased stock. The largest industry represented in the 
sample is the medical supply industry, and it accounts for 5.4% of the total 
sample.
54
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Table 4-1: Industries Represented in the Sample
The industries included in the final sample of 1,598 firms are listed in 
descending order according to the number of firms within each industry. For 
example, 87 firms in the medical supply industry are included in the sample 
and 32 of them (36.78%) repurchased stock during their fiscal year ending 







Percent of Industry 
that Repurchased
Medical Supplies 87 32 36.78%
Software 71 28 39.44%
Retail (Special Lines) 69 23 33.33%
Electronics 67 19 28.36%
Machinery 66 25 37.88%
Drug 63 15 23.81%
Computers 57 14 24.56%
Chemical (Specialty) 52 32 61.54%
Diversified 51 29 56.86%
Industrial Services 48 18 37.50%
Instrument 42 15 35.71%
Medical Services 42 4 9.52%
Petroleum (Producing) 36 12 33.33%
Food Processors 34 13 38.24%
Environment 33 6 18.18%
Electrical Equipment 32 14 43.75%
Telecommunications 
Equipment 32 4 12.50%
Restaurant 31 9 29.03%
Natural Gas (Distributors) 30 7 23.33%
Recreation 30 9 30.00%
T elecommunications 
Services 30 10 33.33%
Semiconductor 27 11 40.74%
Oilfield 26 7 26.92%
Homebuilding 25 7 28.00%
Natural Gas (Diversified) 24 8 33.33%
Paper & Forest Products 24 13 54.17%
Metal Fabrication 21 7 33.33%
Apparel 20 9 45.00%
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Petroleum (Integrated) 20 11 55.00%
Retail Store 20 6 30.00%
Trucking 20 9 45.00%
Publishing 19 13 68.42%
Steel 19 7 36.84%
Aerospace/Defense 17 5 29.41%
Entertainment 16 11 68.75%
Gold/Silver Mining 16 0 0.00%
Office Equipment &
Supplies 16 6 37.50%
Building Materials 15 7 46.67%
Hotel/Gaming 15 6 40.00%
Packaging & Container 15 6 40.00%
Textile 15 7 46.67%
Chemical (Diversified) 14 11 78.57%
Grocery 14 10 71.43%
Newspaper 14 11 78.57%
Auto Parts (Replacement) 13 3 23.08%
Furniture 13 12 92.31%
Manufactured Housing /
Recreational Vehicles 13 6 46.15%
Cement 12 5 41.67%
Air Transport 11 3 27.27%
Household Products 11 7 63.64%
Auto Parts (OEM) 10 4 40.00%
Chemical (Basic) 10 3 30.00%
Shoe 10 5 50.00%
Cosmetics 9 6 66.67%
Maritime 9 4 44.44%
Appliance 7 3 42.86%
Building Supplies 7 3 42.86%
Beverage (Soft Drink) 6 4 66.67%
Mining 6 2 33.33%
Semiconductor Equipment 6 4 66.67%
Advertising 5 4 80.00%
Auto & Truck 5 3 60.00%
Average 25.77 9.79 42.56%
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A three-step process was followed in order to arrive at the final sample 
of 1,596 firms.
Step 1: The filter presented in Table 4-2 was applied to Value Line Investment 
Surveys September 1997, compact disc. There were 624 foreign 
firms that were eliminated because foreign firms are often prohibited 
from repurchasing shares. Seven hundred and forty-one firms in 
industries that face regulatory constraints on equity were also 
eliminated. Two hundred and five firms were eliminated because 
their fiscal year end did not fall in the period between March 31, 1996 
and April 1,1997. There were 1,416 firms that did not have five-year 
sales growth rates. Lastly, 144 firms with negative equity were 
discarded because the price-to-book value ratio is meaningless when 
a firm has negative equity.
Step 2: Global Researcher's November 1997, compact disc was used to obtain 
the prior year's debt-to-asset ratio and price-to-book value ratio for 
the remaining firms. Two hundred and nine firms were eliminated due 
to missing data or unmatched ticker symbols.
Step 3: The 10-Ks of the 1,844 remaining firms were examined on the 
FreeEdgar website in order to obtain the amount of cash distributed 
through stock repurchases. Two hundred and forty-six firms were 
eliminated for various reasons such as an unmatched ticker symbol,
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Table 4-2: Value Line Filter
The following filter was applied to Value Line Investment Survey's September 
1997, compact disc. There are 5,183 observations on the disc, and 2,053 
passed the filter.
Reid Name Logic Value #
Passed
US domicile code Include US 4.559
Industry Exclude Bank 4,334
Industry Exclude Brokers 4,306
Industry Exclude Insurance - Divers. 4.256
Industry Exclude Insurance -  Life 4.222
Industry Exclude Insurance -  Property 4.157
Industry Exclude Fund USA 4.142
Industry Exclude Fund FGN 4.121
Industry Exclude Fund Income 4.109
Industry Exclude R.E.I.T. 4.013
Industry Exclude Thrift 3.917
Industry Exclude Utility Central 3,876
Industry Exclude Utility East 3.836
Industry Exclude Utility West 3.818
FY End > s 1996-04-01 3,779
FY End < s 1997-03-31 3.613
5-Year Sales Growth > -999 (in percent) 2,197
Price-to-Book Value > 0 2,053
a missing statement of cash flows, or a net amount reported for the 
issue (repurchase) of equity.
Eleven of the 607 repurchasing firms used a tender offer. These firms 
were identified by searching the Edgar website for SC 13E-4 filings. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission requires that all firms pursuing a tender 
offer submit this form. The form gives specifics on the tender offer.
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Section 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 4-3 presents descriptive statistics for several variables 
of interest. The average firm distributed 1.20% of its average annual market 
capitalization in cash to shareholders through stock repurchases.3* This 
compares to 1.02% of market capitalization distributed to shareholders through 
dividends. Also, 37.92% of the firms in the sample repurchased stock versus 
46.68% that paid dividends. The 1,598 firms distributed about $52.86 billion 
through repurchases and about $63.55 billion through dividends during the 
fiscal period.37 These findings support the notion that repurchasing stock is an 
important means of distributing cash to shareholders for many firms.
The volatility of RCAP is 2.69 times greater than the volatility of the 
dividend-to-market capitalization ratio (DCAP). This suggests that some firms 
distribute relatively large sums of cash through repurchases while others 
distribute relatively small sums of cash through repurchases, if any. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that firms initially pay a fixed dividend and then 
use any excess liquidity to repurchase stock.
20 If the 11 tender offer repurchasing firms are excluded, the mean and standard deviation of 
RCAP are 1.036 and 2.65.
37 The fact that the average firm distributes more of its market capitalization through 
repurchases than through dividends, but that more dollars are distributed through dividends 
than through repurchases indicates that small firms typically repurchase more of their market 
capitalization than large firms.
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Table 4-3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
The following table provides summary statistics and the correlation matrix for a 
cross-sectional sample of 1,598 firms spanning 62 industries based on a firm’s 
fiscal year ending between 3-31-96 and 4-1-97. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics for the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio (RCAP), dividend-to- 
market capitalization ratio (DCAP), price-to-book value ratio (PB), debt-to-asset 
ratio (D), cash flow-to-total asset ratio (CF), five-year compound annual growth 
rate in sales (G), and total assets (TA). Panel B reports the correlation matrix 
for RCAP, DCAP, PBN (price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry), DN 
(debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry), CFN (cash flow-to-total asset ratio 
normalized by industry), G, and LTA (natural log of total assets).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics orr Raw Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
RCAP (%) 1.20 4.70 0 146.65“
DCAP (%) 1.02 1.75 0 31.75
PB(#) 2.91 3.32 .07 45.30
D(%) 48.01 20.25 1.58 99.22
CF (%) 8.09 12.38 -79.18 61.90
G(%) 7.44 14.20 -48.50 98.50
TA (millions of $) 1.926.71 8.559.60 2.24
Pane/ B: Correlation Mm
RCAP DCAP PBN DN CFN G LTA
RCAP 1
DCAP .080 1
PBN -.030 -.003 1
DN -.036 -.025 .053 1
CFN .080 .142 .174 -.105 1
G -.027 -.118 .087 -.078 .194 1
LTA .043 .269 .052 .286 .187 .102 1
m
* Measuring RCAP using the average annual marital capitalization makes it possible for a firm 
to repurchase over 100% of its market capitalization. Nitches accomplished this by 
repurchasing $9,028 million of stock through a tender offer in the second week of its fiscal year. 
Its average annual market capitalization was $6.77 million. The second highest RCAP was 
47.6%.
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Panel B of Table 4-3 presents the correlation matrix for several variables 
of interest. RCAP and DCAP have a correlation of .08. This positive 
correlation supports the idea that repurchases are not substitutes for dividends 
and vice versa.
The negative relationship between RCAP and PBN is stronger than the 
negative relationship between DCAP and PBN (>.030 versus >.003). One 
interpretation of this finding is that PBN is more responsive to changes in 
RCAP than to changes in DCAP, suggesting that repurchases send stronger 
undervaluation signals than dividends.
RCAP and DCAP are each negatively related to DN and positively 
related to CFN. These correlations imply that low financial leverage and high 
cash inflows are conducive to firms distributing cash to shareholders.
The negative relationship between DCAP and G is much stronger than 
the negative relationship between RCAP and G (-.118 versus -.027). This 
suggests that investment policy has a stronger impact on dividend policy than 
on repurchase policy. This result is plausible if sales growth and asset growth 
are related non-lineariy. For example, assume that a high-growth firm made a 
large asset investment last year and that its asset base will support sales 
growth for the next few years. Also, assume that in a few years the firm 
expects to make another big investment in assets in order to support its rapid 
growth. If this firm currently has excess cash that needs to be distributed to 
shareholders, it will likely choose a stock repurchase over a dividend
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distribution because repurchases can be discontinued without upsetting 
investors. Therefore, high-growth firms that expect to finance their asset 
expansion in waves will probably be unwilling to commit to a perpetual cash 
distribution policy such as a dividend and will be more likely to distribute cash 
sporadically to investors through repurchases.
Each cash distribution variable (RCAP and DCAP) has a positive 
relationship with LTA. One explanation for the positive relationships is agency 
costs. If firm size is a proxy for the diversity of ownership, larger firms will 
benefit more than smaller firms from cash distributions to shareholders 
because of a greater reduction in agency costs.
The positive relationship between DCAP and LTA is much stronger than 
the positive relationship between RCAP and LTA (.269 versus .043). This 
finding suggests that larger firms distribute relatively more cash through 
dividends than through repurchases. Management in large firms may seldom 
perceive that the firm's stock is undervalued because many analysts follow the 
company. Therefore, managers of large companies may decide simply to 
distribute cash through an established dividend policy.
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Section 3: Estimation of the 
Regression Equations
The results of estimating the Open Market Repurchase Model’s 
regression equation over the sample of 1,587 firms are shown in Table 4 - 4 *  
The motivations for repurchasing stock are assumed to be different for open 
market repurchasing firms and tender offer repurchasing firms, therefore the 
sample of 1,587 firms excludes the 11 tender offer repurchasing firms. The 
results provide strong support for Propositions 1 through 5. Firms with low 
valuations as measured by PBN, low financial leverage as measured by ON, 
high cash inflows as measured by CFN, low investment cash outflows as 
measured by G, and more diversity of ownership as measured by LTA are 
expected to repurchase larger percentages of their market capitalization in the 
open market. Each coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% level.
A comparison of the three estimated coefficients of the standardized 
variables (PBN, ON, and CFN) indicates that changes in CFN have the 
greatest impact on RCAP. This suggests that distributing cash to shareholders 
is a stronger motivation for repurchasing shares than taking advantage of 
perceived undervaluation or increasing financial leverage.
The hazard rate, x i, is estimated jointly from the Stage 1 Probit Model 
and the Stage 2 Regression Model. It measures the likelihood that a firm
28 The Open Market Repurchase Model was also estimated using the Heckman two-stage 
procedure, and the results are very similar. The coefficient estimates all have the 
hypothesized signs, but t-statistics are lower. The adjusted R-squared is .26.
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repurchases stock in the open market. Its coefficient estimate is significant, 
indicating that the two-stage procedure is important. Also, the positive 
coefficient estimate indicates that the likelihood that a firm repurchases stock in 
the open market positively impacts RCAP.
The results of estimating the Tender Offer Repurchase Model over a 
sample of 1,002 firms are shown in Table 4-5. The sample includes 11 tender 
offer repurchasing firms and 991 non-repurchasing firms. The model is 
estimated using the Heckman two-stage procedure because this procedure 
uses all 1,002 observations in the Stage 2 regression. Joint estimation uses 
only observations for repurchasing firms in the Stage 2 regression.29 The 
coefficient estimates of PBN and DN are negative, but insignificant.
The Small Firm Undervaluation Model is estimated in order to test 
whether or not the undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms. The 
sample of 1,598 firms includes 587 open market repurchasing firms, 11 tender 
offer repurchasing firms, and 991 non-repurchasing firms. The results of 
estimating the Stage 2 regression are shown in Table 4-6.30 The marginal 
impact on RCAP of a one standard deviation movement in PBN for a firm in the 
smallest total asset quartile is -2.13% . Alternatively, the marginal impact on
Joint estimation results in a targe standard error due to the limited number of tender offer 
repurchasing firms and the substantial variation in RCAP. The coefficient estimates of PBN 
and DN are negative, but the P-values are approximately 1.
The Heckman two-stage procedure yields results that are very similar. The coefficient 
estimates all have the hypothesized signs, but the t-statistics are lower. The adjusted R- 
squaredis.11.
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RCAP of a one standard deviation movement in PBN for a firm in the largest 
total asset quartile is .76% (-2.13% + 2.89%). The P-value for the difference in 
the marginal impacts is .049. This result supports Proposition 8, which 
hypothesizes that the undervaluation motive is stronger for smaller firms.
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Table 4-4: Regression Results from the Open Market Repurchase
Model
RCAPi s Po + P1PBN1 ♦ feDNi ♦ PaCFNi ♦ P4G1 ♦  fcLTAt ♦ f)«i 1 + m 
The dependent variable RCAP is the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio. 
PBN is the beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by 
industry. DN is the beginning of the year debt-to-asset ratio normalized by 
industry. CFN is the cash fiow-to-total asset ratio normalized by industry. G is 
the five-year compound annual growth rate in sales. LTA is the natural log of 
total assets, i  squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1 
probit error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression 
error term. The sample includes 596 open market repurchasing firms and 991 
non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1 Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression 







C -5.86 -7.36 .000
PBN -.64 -2.81 .005
DN -.99 -4.32 .000
CFN 1.84 7.60 .000
G -.04 -2.96 .003
LTA .65 5.35 .000
A
X 5.62 42.75 .000
Rho 1.00 3.62 .000
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Table 4-5: Regression Results from the Tender Offer Repurchase
Model
RCAP, *  Po ♦ piPBNi «■ feDN, + 0 ,1 ,+  4
The dependent variable RCAP is the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio. 
PBN is the beginning of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by 
industry. ON is the beginning of the year debt-to-asset ratio normalized by 
industry. x squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1 probit 
error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression 
error term. The sample includes 11 tender offer repurchasing firms and 991 
non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1 Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression 







C .32 2.53 .011
PBN -.13 -1.05 .295
DN -.14 -1.05 .293
A
X 11.21 24.21 .000
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Table 4-6: Regression Results from the Small Firm Undervaluation
Model
RCAP, = 3o + 0iTA2i ♦  &TA3, ♦ frTA4, *  fcPBN, + fr(PBN,TA2,) +
M PBN.TA3.) ♦  M P B N fT M ) + W  ♦ frCFN, + 0iOG, + 011; ,  + u  
The dependent variable RCAP it the repurchase-to-market capitalization ratio. 
TA2 is a dummy variable coded one for firms in the second total asset quartile 
and zero otherwise. TA3 is a dummy variable coded one for firms in the third 
total asset quartile and zero otherwise. TA4 is a dummy variable coded one for 
firms in the fourth total asset quartile and zero otherwise. PBN is the beginning 
of the year price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry. PBN*TA2, 
PBN*TA3, and PBN*TA4 are interaction terms. DN is the beginning of the year 
debt-to-asset ratio normalized by industry. CFN is the cash flow-to-total asset 
ratio normalized by industry. G is the five-year compound annual growth rate 
in sales. 1 squared is the joint normal distribution between the Stage 1 probit 
error term and the Stage 2 regression error term. Rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the Stage 1 probit error term and the Stage 2 regression 
error term. The sample includes 596 open market repurchasing firms, 11 
tender offer repurchasing firms, and 991 non-repurchasing firms. The Stage 1 
Probit Model and the Stage 2 Regression Model are estimated jointly using the 






C -8.84 -8.76 .000
TA2 -.35
10CM .804
TA3 3.09 2.26 .024
TA4 5.49 3.89 .000
PBN -2.13 •2.54 .001
PBNTA2 1.59 1.00 .317
PBNTA3 1.72 1.41 .160
PBNTA4 2.89 1.96 .049
DN -1.74 -3.40 .001
CFN 2.78 5.16 .000
G -.05 -1.29 .196A
X 11.67 103.24 .000
Rho 1.00 6.93 .000
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
There are three primary conclusions of this study. First, perceived 
undervaluation, financial leverage, excess cash, and agency costs all play 
important roles in determining the percentage of market capitalization a firm 
repurchases in the open market Second, no evidence is found to support the 
hypothesis that perceived undervaluation and financial leverage impact the 
percentage of market capitalization a firm repurchases through a tender offer. 
This is possibly due to the fact that only 11 tender offers were observed during 
the period studied. Third, small firms are more likely to repurchase stock in 
order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation, and large firms are more 
likely to repurchase stock in order to reduce agency costs.
Section 1 of Chapter 5 reviews the eight propositions and the empirical 
evidence relating to each one. Section 2 details the literary contributions and 
managerial implications of this study. Section 3 identifies limitations of this 
study and presents directions for future research.
69
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Section 1: Propositions and 
Empirical Evidence
This study investigates eight propositions presented in Chapter 1. The
propositions are restated in this section along with the evidence that supports
or refutes each one. The Open Market Repurchase Model (Equations 1-a and
1-b on page 50) is used to test Propositions 1 through 5. The Tender Offer
Repurchase Model (Equations 2-a and 2-b on page 50) is used to test
Propositions 6 and 7. The Small Firm Undervaluation Model (Equations 3-a on
page 50 and 3-b on page 51) is used to test Proposition 8.
Proposition 1:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market in order to benefit long-term shareholders.
The regression results in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this proposition. 
The proxy used for undervaluation is the price-to-book value ratio normalized 
by industry (PBN), and its estimated marginal impact on the repurchase to 
market capitalization ratio (RCAP) is negative and significant at the 1 % level.
Proposition 2:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are 
motivated to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in 
the open market in order to move the firm closer to its optimal capital structure.
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The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this 
proposition. The proxy used for financial leverage is the debt-to-asset ratio 
normalized by industry (DN), and its estimated marginal impact on RCAP is 
negative and significant at the 1% level.
Proposition 3:
Firms that have high cash inflows relative to industry peers are motivated 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market. The larger a firm’s cash inflows, the greater the need to distribute cash 
to shareholders, holding other factors constant
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this 
proposition. The proxy used to measure cash inflows is the cash flow-to-total 
asset ratio normalized by industry (CFN), and its estimated marginal impact on 
RCAP is positive and significant at the 1% level.
Proposition 4:
Firms that have lower investment cash outflows are motivated to 
repurchase a larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open 
market The smaller the firm’s investment cash outflows, the greater the need 
to distribute cash to shareholders, holding other factors constant
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this 
proposition. The proxy used for cash outflows is the compound annual growth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
rate calculated over the preceding five-year period (G), and its estimated 
marginal impact on RCAP is negative and significant at the 1% level.
Proposition 5:
Firms that have more diverse ownership structures will repurchase a 
larger percentage of their market capitalization in the open market in order to 
reduce agency costs. Distributing cash through repurchases lowers agency 
costs by forcing the company to rely more heavily on external funds.
The regression results presented in Table 4-4 on page 66 support this 
proposition. The proxy used to measure the diversity of ownership is the 
natural log of total assets (LTA), and its estimated marginal impact on RCAP is 
positive and significant at the 1% level.
Proposition 6:
Firms that appear undervalued relative to industry peers are motivated to 
repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a tender 
offer. A tender offer allows a firm to quickly repurchase a large percentage of 
its stock, thus sending a powerful undervaluation signal to investors.
The regression results presented in Table 4-5 on page 67 provide no 
support for this proposition. The proxy for perceived undervaluation is the 
price-to-book value ratio normalized by industry (PBN), and its estimated 
marginal impact on RCAP is negative but insignificant at the 10% level. The
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insignificant coefficient estimate likely stems from having only 11 tender offer 
repurchasing firms in the sample.
Proposition 7:
Firms that use little financial leverage relative to industry peers are able 
to repurchase a greater percentage of their market capitalization through a 
tender offer in order to take advantage of perceived undervaluation.
The regression results presented in Table 4-5 on page 67 provide no 
support for this proposition. The proxy used for financial leverage is the debt- 
to-asset ratio normalized by industry (DN), and its estimated marginal impact 
on RCAP is negative but insignificant at the 10% level. The insignificant 
coefficient estimate likely stems from having only 11 tender offer repurchasing 
firms in the sample.
Proposition 8:
The undervaluation motive to repurchase stock is stronger for smaller 
firms because they are typically followed by fewer analysts and management is 
therefore more likely to believe the firm is undervalued.
The regression results presented in Table 4-6 on page 68 support this 
proposition. The estimated marginal impact of the price-to-book value ratio 
normalized by industry (PBN) on RCAP for firms in the lowest total asset 
quartile is negative and significant at the 1% level. The estimated marginal
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impact is higher for firms in the largest total asset quartile, and this difference is 
significant at the 5% level.
Section 2: Literary Contributions 
This study makes several literary contributions. It is the only study to 
investigate share repurchase motivations by examining cash distributions made 
to shareholders through share repurchases. Other studies have approached 
this issue either through surveys or by focusing on share price reactions 
following repurchase announcements. This is also the only study on share 
repurchases that employs a censored regression model.
One significant conclusion of this study is that investment policy has a 
stronger negative impact on dividend distributions than on repurchase 
distributions. A plausible explanation for this finding is that high-growth firms 
prefer to make any cash distributions to shareholders through an open market 
repurchase because of its flexibility. Open market repurchases can be 
discontinued easily without upsetting the firm’s stock price. Alternatively, the 
elimination of a dividend distribution is likely to upset investors and depress the 
firm’s stock price. Therefore, it is concluded that high-growth firms have a 
stronger aversion to paying dividends than to repurchasing stock.
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) conclude that small firms 
use tender offer repurchases to correct for undervaluation and large firms use 
repurchases to restructure. The present study's second contribution is the
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finding that small firms use repurchases either through the open market or 
tender offers to correct for perceived undervaluation.
The third contribution of this study is that firms are motivated to 
repurchase stock through the open market in order to take advantage of 
perceived undervaluation, increase financial leverage, distribute cash to 
shareholders, and reduce agency costs. This is also the first study to argue 
that reducing agency costs motivates firms to repurchase stock in the open 
market.
Section 3: Limitations and Directions 
for Future Research
Several limitations exist regarding the application of the preceding 
results. First, the sample consists of only U.S. firms that existed for the five 
years prior to April 1,1997. Second, the firms in the sample were all relatively 
healthy in that they all had positive equity book values for their fiscal year 
ending no later than April 1, 1997. Third, the results only apply to the 
industries included in the analysis and the fiscal year under study. Changes in 
the external environment, such as ordinary and capital gains tax rates, may 
make some repurchase motivations more or less important.
In conducting this study, several directions for future research were 
apparent. First, there is no empirical study that analyzes total cash 
distributions that firms make to shareholders. This study looks at the 
determinants of the repurchase distribution, and Rozeffs (1982) study looks at
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the determinants of the dividend distribution. No study, however, looks at the 
determinants of the total cash distribution to shareholders.
Second, a limitation of previous studies by Rozeff (1982) and Casey, 
Anderson, Dickens, and Mesak (1998) is that "unhealthy” firms were eliminated 
from the study because of negative earnings and/or cash flows. While there 
are disadvantages of expressing dividends as a percentage of market 
capitalization, one significant advantage is that many unhealthy firms do not 
have to be eliminated. An empirical study that analyzes the determinants of 
dividend distributions, expressing dividends as a percentage of market 
capitalization, would provide important insights.
Third, one could argue that the significant cut in the capital gains tax 
rate from 28% to 20% in 1997 gives repurchases an even greater tax 
advantage over dividends. A time series analysis should show a structural shift 
away from dividends and towards repurchases in 1997. This issue could be 
analyzed on a macro and micro level.
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Exhibit 2-1: Theoretical Justification for 
Share Repurchases
Bierman, Jr. and West (1966) Repurchase distributions are more 
tax friendly than dividend 
distributions.
Elton and Gruber (1968) Considers transaction costs and 
heterogeneous investors and 
concludes that some companies find 
a dividend strategy optimal, while 
others find a repurchasing strategy 
optimal.
Vermaelen (1984) Analyzes tender offers in a signaling 
framework and determines that 
management’s primary incentives 
for signaling the market are to 
prevent takeovers and to increase 
the value of their stock options. 
(1962-1977,131 tender offers)
Ofer and Thakor (1987) Share repurchases elicit a higher 
share price response than dividend 
increases because of false signaling 
costs.
Williams (1988) Derives the efficient mix of 
dividends, investments in real 
assets, and new equity sales.
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) Provides justification for 
repurchases that is not based on a 
premium above the market price.
Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989) Repurchases are used as a 
takeover defense by managers to 
signal shareholders.
Talmor and Titman (1990) Compares the tax effects of dividend 
distributions and share repurchases.
Hausch and Seward (1993) High-quality firms can distinguish 
themselves from low-quality firms by 
repurchasing shares.
Persons (1994) The fixed-price method is a better 
signaling device than the Dutch 
auction method, but the Dutch 
auction method is a better takeover 
deterrent.
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Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1997) Open market repurchase programs 
create an option for management to 
repurchase shares when the “true" 
value is greater than the market 
value. The price change during the 
announcement period reflects the 
value of this option. (1980-1990, 
892 firms)
Persons (1997) Develops a signaling model that 
incorporates heterogeneous 
shareholder reservation values.
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Exhibit 2-2.1: Repurchase Announcement Effects 
on Share Prices: Tender Offers and 
Open Market Repurchases
Stewart, Jr. (1976) Repurchasing firms outperform non­
repurchasing firms in the years 
following a repurchase. (1954- 
1973, 5,591 repurchasing and 
11.128 non-repurchasing firms)
Oielman, Nantell, and Wright (1980) Tender offers have a positive effect 
on a company’s return in the short 
run. (1957-1974.174 repurchases)
Masulis (1980) Calculates an average tender offer 
announcement period return of 17% 
and attributes the increase in wealth 
to shareholder tax reductions and 
wealth transfers from senior security 
holders. (1963-1978,199 
announcements)
Dann (1981) Fails to support the expropriation 
hypothesis. (1962-1976.143 offers)
Vermaelen (1981) Supports the signaling hypothesis 
and analyzes the determinants of 
the announcement period abnormal 
return. (1962-1977,243 open- 
market repurchases, 131 tender 
offers)
Asquith and Mullins (1986) Reviews work on equity cash flows.
Barclay and Smith (1988) Repurchase announcements cause 
bid-ask spreads to increase, which 
reduces liquidity and causes the 
required rate of return on stock to 
increase. (1970-1979, 244 
announcements)
Netter and Mitchell (1989) Firms announcing repurchase 
programs following the October 
1987 stock market crash earned 
positive abnormal returns. (1987, 
598 firms)
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Davidson and Garrison (1989) Finds a negative price reaction to 
tender offers used as a takeover 
defense mechanism. (1978-1983, 
62 firms)
Pugh and Jahera (1990) Finds that the abnormal returns 
earned during a tender offer are 
positively related to a firm’s debt-to- 
asset ratio. Supports leverage 
hypothesis. (1978-1985, 32 firms)
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) Two trading rules involving tender 
offers earn substantial abnormal 
returns. (1962-1986,221 tender 
offers)
Comment and Jarrell (1991) Provides support for the signaling 
hypothesis by analyzing abnormal 
returns during the announcement 
period for fixed-price tender offers, 
Dutch auction tender offers, and 
open market authorizations. (1984- 
1989,165 Dutch auction and tender 
offers, 1,197 open market 
announcements).
Dann, Masulis, and Mayers (1991) Concludes that a company typically 
experiences a reduction in risk and 
an increase in earnings following a 
tender offer announcement. (1969- 
1978,122 repurchases)
Hertzel and Jain (1991) Concludes that tender offer 
announcements convey favorable 
information about the level and 
riskiness of future earnings. (1970- 
1984, 226 announcements)
Bartov (1991) Concludes that a company typically 
experiences a reduction in risk and 
an increase in earnings following 
open market repurchase 
announcements. (1978-1986,185 
announcements)
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Howe, He, and Kao (1992) Finds no evidence that Jensen’s 
free cashflow theory explains the 
market reaction to announced 
tender offers. (1979-1989,115 
announcements)
Brown and Ryngaert (1992) Argues that accepting stock from 
another company is more costly 
than tendering and paying capital 
gains taxes. (1978-1986,143 
tender offers)
Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamurti 
(1994)
Contrary to Barclay and Smith 
(1988), they find that bid-ask 
spreads do not increase following 
open market repurchase 
announcements. (1983-1990,181 
open market repurchase 
announcements)
Wiggins (1994) Identifies firms that repurchased 
shares and finds no change in their 
bid-ask spreads. (1988-1990,195 
open market repurchase 
announcements)
Miller and McConnell (1995) Reports no change in bid-ask 
spreads following open market 
share repurchase announcements. 
(1984-1988,248 announcements)
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995)
Firms announcing an open market 
repurchase program earned positive 
risk-adjusted returns in the four-year 
period following the announcement. 
(1980-1990.1.239 announcements)
Raad and Wu (1995) Finds that net insider purchases of 
stock prior to a share repurchase 
announcement is a positive 
determinant of the announcement 
period abnormal return. (1982- 
1990.204 firms)
Vafeas and Joy (1995) Finds that the abnormal return 
associated with an open market 
repurchase announcement is 
negatively related to agency costs. 
(1985-1992.162 repurchases)
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Ratner, Szewczyk, and Tsetsekos 
(1996)
The researchers find that a larger 
tender offer announcement period 
abnormal return is associated with 
lower levels of institutional 
ownership. (1970>1986, 88 
announcements)
Tsetsekos, Uu, and Floras (1996) Finds that the market reaction to 
repeat announcements is similar to 
initial announcements. (1981-1988, 
417 announcements)
Chhachhi and Davidson (1997) The researchers find that tender 
offer announcements generally have 
higher abnormal returns than 
specially designated dividend 
announcements and attribute the 
difference to taxes. (1978-1989,
117 observations)
Liu and Ziebart (1997) Findings suggest that firms having 
positive abnormal returns during the 
announcement period tend to have 
negative abnormal returns over the 
10,40, and 60-day post­
announcement periods. (1984- 
1989,244 observations)
Foqan and McCorry (1997) Report that bid-ask spreads during 
the announcement period of a Dutch 
auction repurchase increase and 
then decrease during the expiration 
period. They attribute this to the 
increased risk exposure of security 
dealers during a Dutch auction 
repurchase. (1981-1991,81 
observations)
Kadapakkam and Seth (1997) Findings indicate that abnormal 
returns earned on the expiration day 
of Dutch auction repurchases are 
inversely related to the marginal 
investor's capital gains tax rate.
This helps explain the upward 
sloping supply curve in tender 
offers. (1987-1989,42 
observations)
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Share Repurchases
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Bradley and Wakeman (1983) Repurchases from insiders or small 
shareholders increase the wealth of 
non-participating shareholders. 
Block repurchases decrease the 
wealth of non-participating 
shareholders. (1974-1980,25 
insiders, 15 small holdings, and 61 
block repurchases)
Dann and DeAngelo (1983) Calculates negative returns for 
standstill agreements and block 
repurchases. (1977-1980, 30 
standstill agreements and 41 
targeted repurchases).
Holdemess and Sheehan (1985) Target firms earn a positive 
abnormal return during the 
purchase-to-repurchase period. 
(1977-1981.12 repurchases)
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) Findings partially support 
shareholders' interest hypothesis. 
(1979-1983. 77 firms)
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) Firms that engage in block 
repurchases have higher 
management turnover, which 
supports the management 
entrenchment hypothesis. (1978- 
1983. 73 repurchases)
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Young (1969) Repurchasing firms use less 
financial leverage, have relatively 
lower operating performance, and 
have relatively lower P/E ratios 
when compared to non-repurchasing 
firms. (1960-1967. 227 firms)
Norgaard and Norgaard (1974) Repurchasing firms have lower 
market-to-book value ratios, P/E 
ratios, dividend payout ratios, 
historical growth rates, liquidity 
ratios, and higher debt-to-equity 
ratios. (1973,60 repurchasing firms 
and 60 non-repurchasing firms)
Finnerty (1975) Equity issuers use more financial 
leverage and have lower dividends 
than equity repurchasing firms. 
(1972. 715 firms).
Medury, Bowyer, and Srinivasan 
(1992)
Repurchasing firms use less 
financial leverage, have less 
liquidity, have higher dividend 
yields, and are more profitability 
than non-repurchasing firms. (1983- 
1986. 860 firms)
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Exhibit 2-4: Other Research
Austin (1969) Concludes that using funds to 
repurchase stock is an important 
event. (1961-1967.1000 firms)
Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1981) According to CFOs, the two main 
reasons for repurchasing shares are 
for investment purposes and to 
acquire shares for stock options. 
(1980, 73 repurchasing CFOs, 63 
other CFOs)
Kale, Noe, and Gay (1989) Transferable put rights (TPRs) are 
more tax efficient than fixed-price 
tender offers.
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) Highlights ways that firms distribute 
cash to shareholders.
Denis (1990) Payout strategies in response to a 
hostile takeover have differing 
effects on shareholder value. 
(1980-1987. 49 firms)
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991) Dutch auctions and TPRs are 
efficient and better for non-tendering 
stockholders, but fixed-price tender 
offers send the strongest signal.
Gay, Kale, and Noe (1991) Survey supports signaling 
hypothesis and rejects dividend 
substitution hypothesis. (1988,140 
responses)
Tsetsekos, Kaufman, and Gitman 
(1991)
Survey of CFOs indicates that the 
leverage hypothesis is the most 
common motive for repurchasing 
shares. (183 responses).
Gay, Kale and Noe (1996) Finds that tender premiums in a 
Dutch auction are negatively 
associated with bidding competition 
and positively associated with the 
number of shares sought.
Cudd, Duggal, and Sarkar(1996) Shareholder wealth is positively 
related to share repurchases that 
are undertaken for control or for 
signaling reasons. (1984-1987, 77 
repurchases)
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Cole, Helwege, and Laster (1996) The dividend yield is low by 
historical standards even after 
adjusting for repurchases.
Cash and Dickens (1996) Discusses the tax consequences of 
a share repurchase for an oil and 
gas company and its shareholders.
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